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Tort Remedy for Bad Faith Breaches of
Intracorporate Fiduciary Duty
American corporations have generated or contributed to many of
the most notable economic, technological, and social achievements
of recent world history.' The strength and expansion of corporations
has been responsible, in part, for the unprecedented economic well-
being and standard of living enjoyed in American society.2 The business
corporation, the most important economic institution of this nation,3
is owned by shareholders. 4 The corporate entity has flourished on
the economic principle of pooling shareholder investments.5 Control
of the corporation then is centralized by shareholder delegation of
managerial power to the directors and officers. As a result of this
delegation, shareholders and society derive greater benefits from the
specialized skill and expertise of a centralized management.'
Interference with management decisions by shareholders and outsiders
may reduce the efficiency and profitability of the corporation.' For
purposes of this comment, this economic theory of pooling and
specialization of management without interference will be referred to
as the "corporate might" theory.
To ensure that the delegated power of corporate might is not used
to the detriment of the shareholders, California has imposed a fiduciary
duty on the officers, directors, and majority shareholders of the
corporation.9 The term "fiduciary"'" covers relationships in which
1. F. STEc iEsT, CORPORATE PERFORiANCE 1-2 (1982).
2. Id.
3. E. MASON, THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 1 (1959).
4. See R. HAmLTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS, 1-2 (2d ed. 1981).
5. Id. at 122. "Pooling benefits the participants because it may produce economies of
scale, shift risk from individuals to larger groups, and create the means of accomplishing projects
that individuals with isolated resources could not undertake." Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71
CMLI. L. REV. 795, 804 (1983).
6. See R. HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 122.
7. See Frankel, supra note 5, at 800-04. Specialization or division of labor maximizes
the productivity of individuals by directing their work efforts in a particular and productive
area. See id. In addition, given the tremendous amount of information available, a person
would have a difficult, if not impossible, task of becoming an expert in all fields. See id.
For example, the theory allows a business manager to specialize in making business decisions
rather than performing all the tasks of the corporation like programming computers, typing,
bookkeeping, making sales, loading freight, and cleaning the floors. See id.
8. See id. at 813.
9. Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 419, 241 P.2d
66, 74 (1952).
10. The term "fiduciary" is very broad. J. SHEPHERD, LAw OF FiouciRIs 3-6 (1981).
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one party entrusts or confides the execution of a task to another,
the fiduciary, who acts as a substitute and for the benefit of the
entrustor." While this delegation gives the fiduciary a position of
superiority and influence over the entrustor,'" the vulnerability of the
entrustor to abuse of power does not result from an initial inequality
of bargaining power or lack of sophistication.' 3 Instead, the very nature
and structure of the fiduciary relation creates the risk of abuse. 4
Possession of this entrusted power creates a risk that the fiduciary
will misuse the power and injure the entrustor.ls The duty of good
faith and inherent fairness that corporate fiduciaries knowingly assume
benefits both society and the shareholders.' 6 This duty should be
enforced to protect the shareholders and encourage the delegation of
power. 7
The cultural and legal values of society place a premium on the
right of an individual to be free from negligent or intentional harm."
Even more reprehensible than the infliction of this general harm is
intentional harm to be inflicted on those in fiduciary relationships
who cannot protect themselves.' 9 For purposes of this comment, the
fiduciary theory of promoting duty and loyalty and protecting
entrustors, independent of corporate law, will be referred to as the
"individual right" theory.
The internal governance of corporations, including the rights of
shareholders, is a matter of state law.2" State legislatures, however,
have been criticized for enticing businesses to incorporate within their
state borders by sacrificing shareholder checks on management.2'
Courts of equity have refrained from defining the exact parameters of the definition to avoid
exclusion of other and perhaps new relations. See id.
11. Frankel, supra note 5, at 800-01, 808-09. The term "entrustor" was coined by Pro-
fessor Frankel to designate the party to whom the fiduciary duty is owed. See id. at 800 n.
17. This definition will be accepted for the purposes of this comment.
12. See J. SHEPHERD, supra note 10, at 61-64.
13. Frankel, supra note 5, at 810.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 809-11.
16. See id. at 802-03, 816.
17. See id. at 816-32.
18. Note, An Insurer's Bad Faith Refusal to Pay a Valid First Party Claim: A Tort Whose
Time Has Come In Iowa, 32 DRAKE L. REv. 987, 987-88 (1983).
19. Frankel, supra note 5, at 832 (this is the position the entrustor occupies in fiduciary
relationships).
20. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975).
21. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663,
663-98 (1974); Ruder, Current Issues Between Corporations and Shareholders: Private Sector
Responses to Proposals for Federal Intervention Into Corporate Governance, 36 Bus. LAw.
771, 771-73 (1981); Ichan, Stop Oppressing Corporate Shareholders in America: Most Executives
Know More About Saving Their Skins Than Saving Their Companies, L.A. DAILY J.,
May 27, 1983, at 4, col. 3; Geneen, Why Directors Can't Protect The Shareholders, FoRTuNE,
Sep. 17, 1983, at 28-32; see R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELioAsN, TAMO THE GIANT CORPORA-
TION 33-71 (1976).
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Delaware has led the competition in a "race for the bottom" 2 by
watering down shareholder rights vis-a-vis corporate management.23
The purpose of this race was to attract corporate business by creating
lenient corporation laws.2" Prior to 1975, shareholders predominantly
relied on federal law for relief from the oppressive imbalance created
by state law favoring the corporate might.2 5 The United States Supreme
Court, however, subsequently left a void for enforcement of the
individual right by ruling that federal securities law would not be
applied as a substitute for the state law governing internal corporate
management.2 6 The result is that state law often treats the internal
conflicts and injuries of the twentieth century corporation with nine-
teenth century standards and fails to properly balance the interests
of the corporate might and individual right.27 One interest not
adequately protected is freedom of the individual right from inten-
tional breaches of the corporate fiduciary duty of good faith and
inherent fairness.2" California law currently does not provide the cor-
poration or shareholders with a tort remedy for a bad faith breach
of the corporate fiduciary duty.2" Equitable remedies,30 particularly
in their application by California courts, do not afford shareholders
adequate compensation or protection from violations of the special
trust and good faith required by law.3' When the policies of corporate
22. Professor William Cary, former Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, coined the phrase "race for the bottom." See Cary, supra note 21, at 666.
23. See Fischel, The "Race To The Bottom" Revisited: Reflections On Recent Developments
in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. Rav. 913, 915-16 (1982).
24. Id.
25. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5 were broadly
applied. F. O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, at iii-vii (1975, Supp. 1984);
Roberts, The Status of Minority Shareholders' Remedies for Oppression After Santa Fe and
Singer and the Question of "Reasonable Investment Expectation" Valuation, 6 DEL. J. CoRP,.
L. 16, 18 (1981). The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed that the purpose of federal
law was to promote full disclosure to investors and not to ensure the underlying fairness of
transactions. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977). Since breach
of fiduciary duty per se is not currently protected by federal law, individual shareholders are
more at the mercy of corporate insiders than the unsophisticated public investor. Comment,
Suits For Breach Of Fiduciary Duty Under Rule 10b-5 After Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1874, 1874-81 (1978).
26. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 479-80.
27. See, e.g., R. HAMuToN, supra note 4, at 765. "The managers of a corporation inevitably
will know more about corporate affairs than outside shareholders or members of the public
who may be interested in purchasing shares. There is an obvious temptation to utilize this
superior knowledge to turn a personal profit. Where the transaction takes place through the
facilities of an anonymous stock exchange. . . the common law seems to have no doctrine
that prohibits such transactions." Id.
28. See infra notes 197-236 and accompanying text.
29. See H. BALLANTiNE & G. STERLING, 1 CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS, §102.03 (4th
ed. 1984).
30. "Where a breach of fiduciary duty occurs, a variety of equitable remedies are available,
including imposition of a constructive trust, rescission, and restitution, as well as incidental
damages." Hicks v. Clayton, 67 Cal. App. 3d 251, 264, 136 Cal. Rptr. 512, 520 (1977).
31. See infra notes 197-221 and accompanying text.
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might and individual right conflict, the final balance should reflect
societal values.32
This author proposes a judicially adopted common law tort remedy
for bad faith breach of the fiduciary duties owed to the corporation
and shareholders by corporate directors, officers and majority
shareholders.33 This proposed tort remedy is founded upon the same
policy that promotes the individual right of freedom from bad faith
harm in the insurance and employment law areas.3 ' The duty imposed
on the insurer, employer, and corporate fiduciary must be part of
a comprehensive fiduciary policy that protects the individual right."
In each context, the parameters and consequences of the duty should
be balanced against the adverse interests involved.36 As this author
will demonstrate, application of this tort remedy in the corporate con-
text would preserve the mechanism of entrepreneurial risk and reward
while serving to deter willful breaches of the corporate fiduciary duty."
This comment begins with an example of California corporation
law. The well-known California Supreme Court case of Jones v. H.F.
Ahmanson" is critiqued as an illustration of the imbalance between
the theories of corporate might and individual right.39 A brief survey
of the protection of the individual right in the dynamic areas of
insurance and employment law follows the discussion of Ahmanson.40
32. See Frankel, supra note 5, at 802-03.
33. Remillard, 109 Cal. App. 2d at 419, 241 P.2d at 74.
34. See infra notes 94-145 and accompanying text.
35. See Frankel, supra note 5, at 797, 802-04.
36. Id. at 810 provides:
Fiduciary relations vary by the extent to which each type of fiduciary can abuse his
power to the detriment of the entrustor. The magnitude of the risk of abuse depends
on: (1) the purpose for which the parties established the relation, and consequently
the nature of power that must be delegated to achieve the parties' purposes; (2) the
extent of the powers delegated to the fiduciary; and (3) the availability of protective
mechanisms that reduce the probability of abuse.
The role of these factors in determining the risk of abuse can be demonstrated
by a comparison of different types of fiduciary relations. For example, one of the
main purposes for establishing a public corporation is to provide for centralized
management. Consequently, the directors of the corporation should have freedom
to make timely decisions without resorting to shareholder approval. On the other
hand, employees are usually expected to act only under the employer's control.
Therefore, the entrustor-shareholder in a fiduciary relation with a corporate director
is much more vulnerable to abuse of power than is the entrustor-employer in his
relation with the employee. Id.
37. See infra notes 237-54 and accompanying text.
38. 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969). The trial court sustained the
demurrer of defendants without leave to amend and was affirmed by the appellate court in
Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Company, 76 Cal. Rptr. 293, 299 (1969) [hereinafter referred to
as Ahmanson I]. This decision was vacated by the California Supreme Court in Jones v. H.F.
Ahmanson, I Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592[hereinafter cited as Ahmanson I1l.
39. See Krendl, The Progeny of Santa Fe v. Green: An Analysis of the Elements of a
Fiduciary Claim Under Rule 10b-5 and a Case for a Federal Corporation Law, 59 N.C.L.
Rav. 231, 233 (1981).
40. See infra notes 94-145 and accompanying text.
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The author notes the similarity of duties and the inherent conflicts
of interest involved in these two substantive areas of law." In each
context, the courts have applied the same individual right doctrine,
but have tailored the application of the tort remedy to balance and
protect the competing values at stake.42 An examination then will be
undertaken of judicial policy decisions to apply tort remedies to claims
that historically, like the claims for bad faith breach of corporate
fiduciary duty, were not governed by tort law.
43
The traditional and modem corporate law of fiduciary duty then
will be introduced," followed by a discussion of the extent of the
fiduciary duty owed by officers, directors and majority shareholders. 5
This author then notes that the structure of modem corporate manage-
ment creates a greater risk of abuse by corporate fiduciaries than does
the traditional corporate structure.46 This author contends that existing
corporate law, unlike the law of insurance and employment relations,
inadequately compensates victims of fiduciary breaches and fails to
deter the bad faith harm 7.4 Finally, this author concludes that greater
corporate accountability to the individual right is desirable and possible
without stunting the entrepreneurial imagination of industry.
48
Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson
An attempt to enumerate the various types of corporate fiduciary
conduct that give rise to an action for the breach of the duty of good
faith and inherent fairness is beyond the scope of this comment. 9
Indeed, no list could be exhaustive. Instead, the Ahmanson case is
discussed as an illustration of the imbalance in California corpora-
tion law between corporate might and individual right."
In Ahmanson, plaintiff was a member of the minority class of
stockholders of the United Savings and Loan Association of California
(hereinafter referred to as the Association) . The defendants were
the officers and directors of the Association, including many relatives
and business associates of Howard F. Ahmanson and other companies
41. See id.
42. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 94-145 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 146-96 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 154-74 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 180-96 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 197-236 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 237-54 and accompanying text.
49. See generally, O'NEAL, supra note 25, at v-vi (O'Neal has authored an entire book
on just one area of corporate fiduciary abuse, the squeeze-out of minority shareholders).
50. See Krendl, supra note 39, at 334.
51. Ahmanson II, 1 Cal. 3d at 101, 460 P.2d at 466, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
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controlled by the defendants. 2 United Financial Corporation of
California, a Delaware holding company [hereinafter referred to as
United], also was named as a defendant."
The Ahmanson group organized United and then transferred shares
of the Association to the holding company at a 1 to 250 ratio. 4 The
purpose of this exchange was to create a mechanism by which defen-
dants could reap profits from investor interest in the Association."
The Association shares were not readily marketable although the defen-
dants could have made them so. 6 Minority shareholders of the Associa-
tion who were not members of the controlling group were excluded
from acquiring shares in United except upon terms available to the
public." As a result of this exchange, United owned eighty-five per-
cent of the Association stock." Defendants thus maintained control
of United, and through United also controlled the Association."
A public offering of United shares, backed by the control the defen-
dants had over the Association, resulted in a large return of capital
to defendants from which the minority shareholders were excluded.6 0
United then offered to purchase Association shares from the minority
shareholders at a considerably lower price than the comparable worth
in the hands of defendants.6" Although the price was substantially
below Association fair market value and book value, the offer still
was attractive because the minority was locked in to the Association.62
The creation of United had destroyed any other potential markets
in which minority investors could recoup their share earnings.63
Two years prior to the offer from defendants to buy minority shares,
the Association declared extra dividends of seventy-five dollars and
52. Ahmanson I, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
53. Ahmanson II, 1 Cal. 3d at 101, 460 P.2d at 466, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
54. Id. at 102, 460 P.2d at 467, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 595.
55. Id.
56. This stock was not readily marketable due to a high book value, lack of investor in-
formation and facilities, and the closely held nature of the Association. Id. at 113, 460 P.2d
at 474-75, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 602-03. The defendants could have treated the minority fairly by
either causing the Association to have a stock split or creating a holding company that would
have allowed all stockholders to benefit alike. Id.
57. Ahmanson 1, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
58. Ahmanson I1, 1 Cal. 3d at 113, 460 P.2d at 475, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 603.
59. Id.
60. United sold $7,200,000 worth of underwriting stock and convertible debentures.
Ahmanson 1, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 299. Of this amount, $6,200,000 was paid by United to the
original shareholders of United as a distribution on their stock equal to $927 per share. Id.
61. United offered $1,100 per share. Ahmanson II, 1 Cal. 3d at 104, 460 P.2d at 468,
81 Cal. Rptr. at 596. The book value was $1,411.57 per share with annual earnings of $301.15
per share. Id. The equivalent in United stock had a fair market value of $3,700 exclusive of
the $927 return of capital. Id.
62. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
63. Ahmanson 11, 1 Cal. 3d at 114, 460 P.2d at 476, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
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fifty-seven dollars per share.64 After the offer closed, the defendants
caused the Association president and director for both the Associa-
tion and United to inform each minority shareholder that no dividends
other than the regular four dollars per share would be paid in the
near future. The plaintiff alleged this action was taken to pressure
minority shareholders into accepting a subsequent proposed exchange
of Association shares for United shares at a 1 to 51 ratio. 6 At the
hearing before the California Corporations Commissioner for a per-
mit to approve the proposal United attempted to justify the exchange
rate on the basis that the United shares were highly marketable.67
United abandoned the application after minority shareholders ques-
tioned the fairness of the plan." Suit was consequently filed.69
The plaintiff alleged that the defendants used their control of the
Association in bad faith to force minority shareholders to sell their
shares at unreasonable prices.7" Defendant officers, directors and
majority shareholders allegedly breached their fiduciary duties by con-
trolling the corporation to further their personal advantage to the detri-
ment of the minority.' To avoid a derivative action, the plaintiff
stipulated that the Association was not harmed by the breach of
fiduciary duties.72 Fraud was not alleged because defendants had not
made any misrepresentations or failed to disclose information.73 Plain-
tiff, however, did contend that defendants conspired to restrain trade
in violation of the Cartwright Act and common law.74
Both the trial and appellate courts sustained the demurrer of defen-
dants without leave to amend.75 The California Supreme Court reversed
the demurrer on the ground that majority shareholders owe a duty
of good faith and inherent fairness to the minority in any transaction
in which control of the corporation is material. 76 The court failed
64. Id. at 104, 460 P.2d at 468, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 596.
65. Id.
66. A block of 51 United shares had a total value of approximately $2,400 with a book
value of $210 and annual earnings of $134, 85 percent of which reflected Association earnings.
Id. at 105, 460 P.2d at 468-69, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 596-97. The book value of Association stock
exceeded $1,700 per share with annual earnings of $615 per share and the value of each Associa-
tion share in the hands of defendants was $8,800. Id.
67. Id. at 105, 460 P.2d at 469, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. Ahmanson I, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 303.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 295.
73. See Ahmanson II, 1 Cal. 3d at 105, 460 P.2d at 469, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 101, 460 P.2d at 466, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
76. Id. at 115, 460 P.2d at 476, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
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to mention director and officer liability and found no violation of
the Cartwright Act. 7 Despite finding that the destruction of a public
market for Association stock was a foreseeable consequence 78 and that
defendants should have exercised a different course of action,79 the
court ruled that plaintiff was entitled to compensatory relief only in
the form of a shareholder appraisal remedy. 0 Even if plaintiff at a
subsequent trial proved that the actions of the defendants were exer-
cised in an effort to gain additional profits by intentionally locking
the ownership interests of the minority into the Association, tort
damages would not be awarded.' The president of the Association
faced no liability in his management position for bad faith actions
in pressuring minority shareholders to sell at an inadequate price. 2
The maximum liability the defendants faced on remand was to pay
the minority the market value that their shares would have been worth
if defendants originally had acted in good faith. 3
These remedies provide minimal deterrence against bad faith con-
duct, since an innocent breach of the fiduciary duty would result in
the same liability.8" While defendants may have had to account for
some interest for the time the profits were wrongfully withheld, they
enjoyed the use of the money for the same period. 5 Furthermore,
the court ignored the opportunity to establish stronger equitable
remedies.86 Since other remedies were excluded, the trial court on
remand was left with no other equitable or tort remedy to deter a
repeat performance by the defendants.8 Current corporate fiduciaries,
in the same position, know that if they get caught they simply must
pay the minority their fair share, but if the fiduciaries are not caught
they will enjoy an extra profit at the expense of the minority.8"
California has acknowledged that compliance with state corpora-
tion statutes does not relieve the corporate fiduciary of the duty owed
77. See id. at 118-19, 460 P.2d at 478-79, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 606-07.
78. Id. at 117, 460 P.2d at 478, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
79. Id. at 115, 460 P.2d at 476, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 604.




84. See Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule 1Ob-5: A Restitution Alternative
to Tort Damages, 37 VANv. L. Rav. 349, 359, 379 (1984).
85. See Ahmanson II, I Cal. 3d at 118, 460 P.2d at 478, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
86. See Hicks, 67 Cal. App. 3d at 264, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 520. Even the imposition of
an unjust enrichment remedy, however, provides little deterrence since at worst the defendant
must hand back the wrongful gain and if not caught make a handsome profit. See Thompson,
supra note 84, at 396. The defendant does not face any punishment or liability for the wrongful
conduct itself. See id.
87. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 50-87 and accompanying text.
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to the shareholders or the corporation.89 The function of this duty
is to prevent abuse of the individual right. 90 In the absence of
misrepresentation or failure to dislose, as exhibited by Ahmanson,9'
intentional bad faith injury may be freely inflicted on the shareholder
entrustor as far as tort law is concerned. 92 California courts have found
equitable and contractual remedies inadequate to deter analogous bad
faith actions in the insurance and employment relationships.
93
TORT REMEDIES IN INSURANCE AND EMPLOYMENT AREAS
Since 1958, California courts have protected the individual right
from insurers by imposing a duty of good faith and fair dealing on
the relationship of the insurer to the insured.94 The California
Legislature subsequently adopted this duty by statute." Recently, a
similar duty has been extended to employers when the discharge of
employees would be a violation of fundamental public policy. 96 In
each of these relationships competing interests exist, similar to those
in the conflict between the corporate might and the individual right.
97
Yet, a bad faith breach of the duty owed in these relationships gives
rise to not only traditional remedies for breach of the duty, but also
tort remedies. 9
The relationships between the insurer and insured and the employer
and employee are primarily contractual.99 In a contractual environ-
ment, the parties transact to meet their needs or desires.' Breach
of the obligations arising from the contract itself does not give rise
to a tort.'' California courts, however, enforce a societal duty, that
if breached, results in a tort.'0 2 The duty to protect the individual
right in these relationships is not founded upon the will or intention
89. Ahmanson II, 1 Cal. 3d at 108, 109, 460 P.2d at 471, 472, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 599, 600.
90. See supra notes 9-19 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 52-90 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 94-145 and accompanying text.
94. Bourhis, Recognition and Recovery for Bad Faith Torts, TRIAL, Dec. 1982, 46, 47.
95. See CAL. INS. CODE §790.03.
96. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 170, 610 P.2d 1330, 1331, 164
Cal. Rptr. 839, 840 (1980).
97. See Note, supra note 18, at 987 (insurance context); Rohwer, Terminable-At-Will Employ-
ment: New Theories for Job Security, 15 PAC. L.J. 759, 759-60 (1984) (employment context).
98. Bourhis, supra note 94, at 48.
99. See Note, supra note 20, at 987-988 (insurance context); Rohwer, supra note 97, at
759-60 (employment context). The modem shareholder relationship in the corporate context
also has been equated with a contractual relationship. Brudney & Clark, A New Look At Cor-
porate Opportunities, 94 HAlv. L. REv. 997, 1005 (1981); Fischel, supra note 23, at 917.
100. Frankel, supra note 5, at 799-800.
101. Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 175, 610 P.2d at 1334, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 843-44.
102. Id. at 175-76, 610 P.2d at 1334-35, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 843-44.
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of the parties, but upon individual right concerns of society for
unwarranted abuse of power. 3 Contract law, even with the imposi-
tion of equitable remedies, fails to compensate plaintiffs adequately
for extra-contractual harm caused by intentional abuse of the
relationship." 4 The societal duty in each context is measured by the
competing interests involved.0 5 For example, the duty of the employer
in the employment context is less rigid than the duty imposed upon
the insurer.0 6 The clearest application of the individual right doc-
trine in bad faith actions is exhibited in the relationship between the
insurer and the insured.
A. Duty of The Insurer To Respect The Individual Right
California courts have acknowledged the existence of a bad faith
tort for both first0 7 and third party0 8 claims. These actions may be
brought against the insurer for refusing, in bad faith, to pay an insured
for a claim owed under an insurance policy'09 or to settle a claim
with a third party."0 Insurers are not required to pay all claims or
settle with a third party."' Insurers merely are prohibited from
unreasonably refusing to pay or settle an obligation that is due."'
California courts have closely policed the special duty of the insurer
because of the inherent conflict of interest between the loyalty of the
insurer to the insured and the profit motive of the insurer." 3 With
each delay of a payment rightfully owed, insureds face the hardship
of the lack of realization of an expected property right.' "4 Meanwhile,
the insurers attempt to minimize the award of any claim."' Insurers
have a profit incentive to take advantage of the economic benefit they
103. See infra notes 109-36 and accompanying text.
104. See Bolla, Contort: New Protector of Emotional Well-Being in Contract?, 19 WAKE
FoREST L. REv. 561, 577-79 (1983).
105. See Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Company of California,
36 Cal. 3d 752, 768-69, 769 at n.6, 686 P.2d 1158, 1166-67, 1166 at n.6, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354,
362-63, 362 at n.6 (1984); Frankel, supra note 5, at 810.
106. See Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 768-69, 686 P.2d at 1166-67, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63.
107. First party actions involve suits by an insured against an insurer for failing to pay
or unreasonably delaying payment of a claim owed to the insured. See Gruenberg v. Aetna
Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 575, 510 P.2d 1032, 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 486 (1973).
108. See, e.g., Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198
(1958) (third party action brought against insured for refusal of insurer to settle with injured
party, consequently leaving the insured personally liable for judgment in excess of policy limits).
109. See Gruenberg, 9 Cal. 3d at 575, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
110. See Comunale, 50 Cal. 2d at 657-59, 328 P.2d at 200-01.
111. Bourhis, supra note 94, at 48.
112. Id.
113. See Gruenberg, 9 Cal. 3d at 582, 510 P.2d at 1043, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
114. See Note, supra note 18, at 987; Note, Insurance-Bad Faith and First Party Extracon-
tractual Damages, 5 AM. J. TRiAL ADvoc. 497, 500 (1982).
115. See Gruenberg, 9 Cal. 3d at 582, 510 P.2d at 1043, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
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derive from inadequate payments and delay.'1 6 On the other hand,
insureds lack an efficient remedy in contract law for harm caused
by the bad faith delay." 7 Prior to the judicial adoption of a tort
remedy, insureds were forced to litigate their claims unnecessarily while
insurers would profit from the interest accruing on these claims." 8
Ordinary contract damages offer no motivation for the insurer not
to breach. ' 9 "In this context, compensatory and contract damages
don't really compensate . . . reparation plus admonition are urgently
required.""'2 To counteract this unfair situation and stem the tide
of unnecessary litigation, California courts adopted a policy designed
to promote good faith insurance settlements.' 2' To safeguard the in-
dividual right of insureds to be free from unreasonable harm, the
courts resorted to tort remedies to enforce the good faith duty of
insurers.'22 Insurance law is not the only area in which tort remedies
recently have been utilized to protect the individual right.'23 Califor-
nia courts have applied tort remedies to the employer-employee
relationship. 24
B. Duty of the Employer to Respect the Individual Right
The California Supreme Court in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.'25
held that a wrongfully discharged employee has a tort action with
corresponding remedies against an employer.' 26 The terminable-at-will
employee'27 in Tameny was discharged for refusing to coerce gasoline
retailers into setting lower prices as part of a scheme to violate the
Sherman Antitrust and Cartwright Acts.' 2' The supreme court in
Tameny stated that to allow an employer to discharge an employee
for refusing to violate a statute would be obnoxious to the interests
of the state and contrary to public policy.' 29 The employer involved
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 579, 510 P.2d at 1041, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
119. Wallis v. Superior Court (Kroehler Mfg. Co.), 160 Cal. App. 3d - , 207 Cal. Rptr.
123, 128 (1984).
120. Diamond, The Tort Of Bad Faith Breach Of Contract; When, If At All, Should It
Be Extended Beyond Insurance Transactions?, 64 MARQ. L. REv. 425, 447 (1981) (quoting
Lambert, Commercial Litigation, The Case For Punitive Damages (including their coverage
by liability insurance), 35 Am. TRu LAWYER'S ASS'N L. J. 164, 225-26 (1974)).
121. See Gruenberg, supra note 107 at 574, 510 P.2d at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
122. See id.
123. See Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 176, 610 P.2d at 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 844 (1980).
124. Id.
125. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
126. Id. at 170, 610 P.2d at 1331, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
127. "Under the traditional common law rule, codified in California Labor Code section
2922, an employment contract of indefintie duration is in general terminable at 'the will' of
either party." Id. at 172, 610 P.2d at 1332, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
128. Id. at 171, 610 P.2d at 1332, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
129. Id. at 176, 610 P.2d at 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
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in Tameny was found to have breached not only an unwritten employ-
ment contract, but more importantly, a societal duty that protects
the individual right to be free from unreasonable harm.'3 ° Although
the discharge by the employer in Tameny was not specifically barred
by statute, the court nevertheless ruled that statutes may articulate
fundamental public policy that must be protected.' 3'
The relationship between an employer and an employee, like the
relationship between an insurer and an insured, presents a risk of
abuse.132 Duties of loyalty and good faith may be imposed on both
the employer and the employee regardless of contractual obligations., 3
The employer in Tameny intentionally abused the special duties owed
to the employee in an attempt to reach an end that violated fun-
damental public policy and inflicted harm upon the employee.' 34 The
contention of the employer that the employee was limited to contrac-
tual damages was rejected. 3 ' The court held public policy required
that the employee, like the insured, have access to tort remedies,
including compensation for emotional harm and the imposition of
punitive damages in order to punish and deter bad faith infringement
on the individual right.'36
C. Tort Remedies and Punitive Damages for Breach of Duty
Plaintiffs in both the employment and insurance contexts have tort
causes of action for bad faith breach of the duty to respect the
individual right."' The general rule in California is that the injured
party may recover tort damages for all detriment incurred, whether
anticipated or not."3 ' Since breach of the good faith duty is considered
an intentional tort, 3 9 recovery may include damages for economic
130. Under both statutory and common law an employer does not enjoy an absolute right
to discharge an at-will employee. Id. at 172, 610 P.2d at 1332-33, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 841-42.
Discharge of an employee is limited by statutory objectives or firmly established principles of
public policy. Id.
131. Id. at 176, 610 P.2d at 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
132. See supra notes 113-31 and accompanying text.
133. Fiduciary relations do not give rise to reciprocal legal obligations. Frankel, supra note
5, at 818-20. The obligations placed on the employee are not designed to benefit the employer,
but rather to facilitate the performance of services by creating an incentive to act diligently.
See id.
134. See Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 170, 610 P.2d at 1331, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
135. Id. at 174-75, 610 P.2d at 1334, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
136. Id. The general rule is that the injured party may recover tort damages for all detri-
ment caused whether the injury could have been anticipated or not. See CAL. CIV. CoDE §3333.
Punitive damages are available when a defendant is found guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice,
CAL. CIV. CODE §3294.
137. See supra notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
139. Note, Insurance-Bad Faith and First Party Extracontractual Damages, 5 Am. J. TRiAL
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loss and mental distress, as well as punitive damages.' 0 An invasion
of a property interest is sufficient harm to trigger the tort remedy.'"
Additionally, if the plaintiff shows that the defendant is guilty of
oppression, fraud or malice, punitive damages may be awarded.'
4 2
In applying this standard, California courts allow juries to assess
punitive damages following a determination that the defendant acted
with a conscious disregard of the rights of the plaintiff.' 3
The expansion of remedies for bad faith breaches of the duty owed
in insurance and employment relationships represents only two areas
in which California courts have continued to develop the common
law., 44 The development of these areas of the law illustrates that tort
remedies are needed to compensate victims and deter repeated bad
faith violations of the individual right.'45 Having established that breach
of the duty protecting the individual right gives rise to tort remedies
in contractual relationships, this author will proceed by analogizing
to the fiduciary duties existing in internal corporate relationships.
PAST AND PRESENT CORPORATE FIDUCIARY
DUTY: GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
The interests of the corporate might and the individual right must
be balanced to avoid entrepreneurial stagnation.'46 The corporate might
ADvoc. 497, 500 (1982); see V. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, 130, 1029 (5th ed.
1984).
140. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
141. Note, infra note 146, at 500.
142. Defendant must act with the intent to vex, injure, or annoy, or with a conscious disregard
of the rights of the plaintiff to justify an award of exemplary damages. Pistorius v. Prudential
Insurance Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 541, 553, 176 Cal. Rptr. 660, 667 (1981).
143. Id.
144. In Seaman's, the California Supreme Court declined to decide if breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in all contracts always gives rise to an action in tort.
Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 767-69, 686 P.2d at 1166-67, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63. The court
noted that in the insurance context, emphasis has been placed on the "special relationship"
between insurer and insured, characterized by elements of public interest, adhesion and fiduciary
responsibility. Id. at 768, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362. The court then added:
"No doubt there are other relationships with similar characteristics and deserving of similar
legal treatment" and cited Tameny and the employment relationship. Id. at 769, 686 P.2d at
1177, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 373. Chief Justice Bird, in a concurring opinion, however, stated that
tort liability should be imposed upon a showing of bad faith even in the context of the ordinary
commercial contractual relationship involving parties of roughly equal bargaining power. Id.
at 784, 686 P.2d at 1177, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 373; see also Wallis, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 1116,
207 Cal. Rptr. at 127 (the court found characteristics similar to the insurance relationship in
an employment relationship and allowed claims of plaintiff for bad faith breach of contract).
145. Bourhis, supra note 94, at 48.
146. See Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE
L.J. 857, 864-67 (1984).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 16
interests, in the form of the business judgment rule,' 7 dictate that
directors and officers will not be held liable on the basis of hindsight
for negligent business decisions that create losses or fail to maximize
the return on capital.' 8 If liability did attach to these decisions,
management might be overly conservative and, in effect, cheat investors
by always failing to maximize capital return.'"9 The business judg-
ment rule, however, is not designed to protect corporate fiduciaries
from liability for intentional breaches of their fiduciary duty.' State
law balances the corporate might interest against the individual right
interest by imposing a fiduciary obligation on directors, officers and
majority shareholders.' 5' This fiduciary duty is owed to both the cor-
poration and the shareholders." 2 The parameters of this fiduciary duty
escape precise definition and may vary depending on the parties
involved. ' An analysis of this fiduciary duty imposed upon officers,
directors, and majority shareholders within the corporate structure
follows. The fiduciary position to be examined first is that of a cor-
porate director.
A. Traditional Structure of the Corporation
Directors are charged with overseeing the corporation for the benefit
of the shareholders.' 4 They are elected by the votes of the
shareholders, based on ownership interest.' 55 The primary function
of the board of directors is to oversee and evaluate the performance
of management in running the corporation.5 6 The California Cor-
porations Code requires that directors perform their duties in the man-
ner they believe to be in the best interest of the corporation.' 57 This
is the statutory manifestation of the business judgment rule." 8 As
long as business decisions are made in a reasonable and good faith
manner, directors need not fear personal liability.' 9
147. Under the business judgment rule, courts presume that corporate management deci-
sions were made in good faith and in the best interests of the corporation. See 1 Ballantine
& Sterling, supra note 29, at §102.01. This rule reflects a judicial policy of refraining from
second guessing corporate management and policy decisions.
148. Kraakman, supra note 146, at 883-84.
149. Id.
150. The business judgment rule is intended to protect only decisions made in good faith.
See infra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
151. See infra notes 154-96 and accompanying text.
152. See id.
153. 1 H. MARSH, MARSH's CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAW §10.3, at 576 (2d ed. 1981).
154. Id.
155. See R. HAMU.TON, supra note 4, at 375-76.
156. Geneen, supra note 21, at 28.
157. CAL. CORP. CODE §309(a).
158. 1 H. MARSH, supra note 153, §10.3, at 571.
159. Id. The "reasonable" standard is considered in light of the business judgment rule,
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While not technically trustees, directors bear a fiduciary relation-
ship to the corporation and the shareholders. 6 ' This relationship
imposes a duty of the highest good faith upon directors.' 61 They are
required to act in the best interests of the corporation and not for
the purpose of personal profit or gain.'62 A director violates this
fiduciary duty by making or retaining secret profits.' 63 The role of
a corporate officer carries a similar duty to that of the corporate
director. '64
Traditionally, officers have been delegated the authority to manage
the daily routine of the corporation. 165 Courts have held that the duty
of good faith and fair dealing owed by directors extends to officers. 66
Since the duties owed by officers vary with their positions, however,
they may be subject to higher or lower standards of care than
directors.'67 Thus, these fiduciaries cannot secure for themselves
advantages not available to the shareholders in general. 68 The officers
also enjoy protection from negligent business decisions rendered within
the confines of the business judgment rule.
69
The majority shareholders owe a similar fiduciary duty to minority
shareholders. 7 ' This duty also is imposed on a dominant or controll-
ing shareholder or groups of shareholders although this duty is not
expressly provided in the California Corporations Code. 7 ' This duty
arose from the potential of a dominant shareholder to manipulate
the corporation or corporate property for the personal benefit of the
majority, to the detriment of the minority.'72 California courts closely
scrutinize dealings between the majority shareholder and the corpora-
tion, particularly when the transactions result in the sale or control
of the corporation.'73
Prior to Ahmanson, this close judicial scrutiny only applied to a
sale or transfer of actual control of the corporation.'74 The California
consequently, liability for negligence is extremely limited. See 6 B. WITKIN, StIMARY OF
CALiFoRNIA LAw, Corporations §91, at 4388 (8th ed. 1974).
160. Remillard, 109 Cal. App. 2d at 419, 241 P.2d at 74.
161. Id.
162. 6 B. WviTKIN, supra note 159, §80, at 4378.
163. 1 H. MARSH, supra note 153, §10.6, at 589.
164. Id.
165. See id. §10.1, at 568.
166. Remillard, 109 Cal. App. 2d at 418-19, 241 P.2d at 74.
167. 1 H. MARsH, supra note 153, at 576.
168. Remillard, 109 Cal. App. 2d at 419, 241 P.2d at 74.
169. 1 H. MARSH, supra note 153, at 575.
170. 6 B. WrrKiN, supra note 159, §164 at 4442.
171. 1 H. BALL TIE & G. STEaRING, supra note 29, §102.03, at 6-19.
172. Id.
173. Ahmanson II, 1 Cal. 3d at 108, 460 P.2d at 471, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
174. Id. at 111-12, 460 P.2d at 473-74, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 601-02.
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Supreme Court, however, found that the traditional rule was
insufficient to protect the minority shareholders in all circumstances.' 75
Since no sale or transfer of actual control had taken place in
Ahmanson, the injury to minority shareholders could be "inflicted
with impunity" under traditional law.'76 Breaking with traditional law,
the supreme court in Ahmanson imposed a comprehensive rule of
good faith and inherent fairness in any transaction in which the con-
trol of the corporation is material.' 77 The court stated that the use
of majority power to control the corporation should be considered
in the same light as that of a trustee dealing with a trust estate and
beneficiary.'78 The method used to ensure this trust in Ahmanson,
however, was only the equitable imposition of compensatory damages
in the form of a shareholder appraisal remedy. 79 The need for a tort
remedy for bad faith is even more imperative in light of the breakdown
of the traditional corporate structure.
B. The Modern Corporate Structure
Modern corporations tend to place actual control of the corpora-
tion in the hands of the officers.' Officers usually are on the board
of directors and determine the best interests of the shareholders.' 8'
Potential abuse of the individual right is greater in the modern cor-
poration than the traditional model of corporations since the board
of directors cannot effectively oversee the officers.' Officers usually
are on the board of directors and will expel other directors who
diligently question the acts of the management.' 83 Officers are employed
to exercise their skill and best judgment to maximize the wealth of
the corporation, but unchecked conflicts of interest pose great poten-
tial for abuse of their entrusted power. 8 " While officers may receive
incentive bonuses for good performance they are not likely to fire
themselves if they make the wrong decisions.' A national movement
has resulted from this conflict and lack of restraint on corporate
175. Id. at 112, 460 P.2d at 474, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
176. Id.
177. See id. at 115, 460 P.2d at 476, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
178. Id. at 111, 460 P.2d at 473, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
179. Id. at 117, 460 P.2d at 478, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
180. Ruder, supra note 21, at 771; Geneen, supra note 21, 28-32; Ichan, supra note 21, at 4.
181. Geneen, supra note 21, at 29-31.
182. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
183. Geneen, supra note 21, at 29-31 (in more than 75% of the Fortune 500 corporations
the chief executive officer chairs the board).
184. See supra notes 9-19 and accompanying text.
185. See Geneen, supra note 21, at 29-31.
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management with the goal of curbing managerial power. 186 The pro-
ponents of this movement call for federal regulation of internal cor-
porate management to safeguard and promote the individual right.' 87
California courts, however, have yet to respond with new remedies
designed to protect shareholders from managers who promote their
own welfare in derogation of their obligation to shareholders. 8
Corporate fiduciaries owe a duty of good faith to minority
shareholders. 8 9 This good faith duty is breached when the interests
of the shareholders are subordinated in favor of the personal interests
of the fiduciary. 9 ' Unlike application of the individual right theory
in the insurer-insured and employer-employee relationships, the seem-
ingly higher standard of duty imposed upon the corporate fiduciary' 9 '
is not protected by the same tort remedy, despite the historic policy
of California corporation law that abhors breaches of the good faith
duty. 192 In F.&M. Bank v. Downey,' 1 the California Supreme Court
expressed this policy as follows:
When agents and others, acting in a fiduciary capacity, understand
that these rules will be rigidly enforced, without proof of actual
fraud, the honest will keep clear of all dealings falling within their
prohibition and those dishonestly inclined will conclude that it is
useless to exercise their wits in contrivances to evade it.1
94
Unfortunately, the methods of deterring the bad faith of corporate
fiduciaries have not changed greatly since 1879,195 while the corporate
structure and fiduciary laws have.' 96 No longer do modern corporate
directors rely on their own judgment for the benefit of the
shareholders. Instead they are dominated by the will of the corporate
officers. Since the balance has tilted toward the corporate might
without a corresponding weight being placed on the side of the
individual right, state law is currently inadequate to protect the interests
of the individual right.
EXISTING STATE LAW INADEQUATE
The need for legal innovation is apparent as our society shifts from
an industrial orientation to one with an emphasis on high technology
186. Ruder, supra note 21, 771-75.
187. See id.
188. See supra notes 78-88 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 151-79 and accompanying text.
190. See id.
191. See Ahmanson II, I Cal. 3d at 108, 460 P.2d at 471, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
192. F. & M. Bank v. Downey, 53 Cal. 466, 468-69 (1879).
193. 53 Cal. 466.
194. Id. at 468-69.
195. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 180-92 and accompanying text.
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and fiduciary relationships.' 97 Legal remedies should reflect the
importance of the individual right and compensate for the mental suf-
fering caused by the intentional breach of fiduciary duty. 98 The
intentional nature of the bad faith tort is sufficient to dissipate con-
cerns of unlimited liability attaching to negligent business decisions. 99
Furthermore, emotional damage is as real as physical damage and
therefore equally deserving of legal protection.2"'
The societal interest in the individual right is enormous.2°0 Millions
of minority shareholders throughout the nation invest in public
corporations.2 2 The only contacts most shareholders have with direc-
tors and officers of the corporation occur through proxy solicitations.0 3
The directors, officers, and shareholders combine to create a corporate
venture in the quest for profit.20 ' The typical participation by a
minority shareholder, however, is relegated to near total reliance on
the good faith and inherent fairness of the corporate fiduciaries.
2
01
Minority shareholders rely on corporate management to police the
affairs of the corporation.0 6 Decisions involving a conflict between
what is best for shareholders and what is best for management are
decided by management. 2 7 Management has confidential information
and access to the economic power of the corporation.20 8 The imposi-
tion of a good faith requirement upon management, therefore, was
designed to police inherent conflicts of interest.20 9 The potential to
abuse the individual right in intracorporate fiduciary relationships can
be analogized to the conflicts existing in the insurance and employ-
ment relationships. 2'0 While California courts have resorted to imposing
a duty of good faith on all three relationships, only the latter two
are protected by a tort remedy to deter a breach of that fiduciary
duty.2"
197. See Bolla, supra note 104, at 577-79.
198. See id. at 565, 574-79.
199. See id. at 578.
200. Stewart v. Ruder, 84 N.W.2d 816, 824 (Mich. 1957); 1 J. SurHajuAND LAW OF DAMAaOs,
156-57 (1st ed. 1882). "With ever-progessing advances in medical science, it is now
possible to determine with convincing certainty whether plaintiffs have actually suffered a men-
tal or emotional injury. In short, damages for mental distress are moving from the intangible
to more tangible, and becoming increasingly measurable." Bolla, supra note 104, at 566,
201. See supra notes 9-19 and accompanying text.
202. R. HEsSEN, IN DEENSE OF THE CORPORATION, xi (1979).
203. See M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY, 10-42 (1971).
204. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
205. See Frankel, supra note 5, at 814.
206. See supra notes 151-79 and accompanying text.
207. See id.
208. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 97-145 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
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The existing equitable remedies applied to the breach of the cor-
porate duty of good faith are similar to the ineffective remedies for
bad faith previously available in the insurance and employment areas.2"2
Fiduciaries face little deterrence while the courts merely continue to
apply contractual and compensatory remedies under the guise of
equity.2"3 When courts follow the precedent of Ahmanson, the remedy
requires only the return of minority profits accompanied with the legal
rate of interest from the date of the breach. 214 When the legal interest
rate for shareholder appraisal rights is below open market rates, a
bad faith fiduciary may actually profit even if caught. 21 5 The
Ahmanson court could have left the trial court the option of impos-
ing a constructive trust,2"6 requiring the defendants to account for
all the gains, but instead stated that plaintiff was entitled to no more
than the limited compensatory remedy. 2 7 American courts have been
reluctant and unimaginative in the imposition of strong and effective
equitable remedies. 21 8 Application of tort remedies in intracorporate
relationships would serve the same function of protecting the individual
right to be free from unreasonable harm that exists in the insurer-
insured and employer-employee relationships.2"9 In these contexts, tort
law allows recovery for all harm, including emotional injury, caused
by the bad faith interference with the rights of the entrustor.22 ° Under
corporation law, however, tort remedies are available only upon a
showing of fraud. 221 Even in the absence of fraud, a strong deterrent
to breaches of the fiduciary duty of good faith should be available.
A. Inadequate Deterrent to Abuse of Power
The purpose of awarding punitive damages is to discourage
oppression, fraud or malice by punishing the wrongdoer in situations
in which the mere granting of restitution is inadequate to deter.
222
Before committing a breach of duty, the rational corporate fiduciary
considers the repercussions of getting caught.223 If these repercussions
212. See supra notes 119-23, 134-36 and accompanying text.
213. See Wallis, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 1117-18, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
214. Ahmanson II, I Cal. 3d at 117, 460 P.2d at 478, 81 Cal. Eptr. at 606.
215. See supra notes 117-23, 135-36 and accompanying text.
216. See Hicks, 67 Cal. App. 3d at 264, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 520.
217. Ahmanson II, 1 Cal. 3d at 117, 460 P.2d at 478, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
218. O'NEAL, supra note 25, at 582.
219. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
220. See id.
221. See 1 H. BALLANTiNE & G. STERLING, supra note 29, at §101.
222. Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31 HASTINGS
L.J. 639, 648 (1980).
223. See Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE
L.J. 49, 59-65 (1982).
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multiplied by the odds of getting caught are less than the personal
rewards to be received by the fiduciary if the good faith duty is
breached, a monetary incentive exists for the fiduciary to act in bad
faith. 224 Due to this potential abuse of power, a fiduciary duty is
imposed upon corporate management. 25 Current remedies, explained
above, add little weight to the repercussions considered by the cor-
porate fiduciary.22 6 This is particularly true with fiduciaries of large
corporations because they enjoy the protection of liability insurance
purchased by the very corporation they have betrayed. 2" The possibility
of facing punitive damages, however, would become an additional
factor to deter bad faith. 22 1 In many cases such as Ahmanson, the
corporation suffers no harm.229 Courts should not excuse self serving
wrongful actions merely because the plaintiff did not suffer an ascer-
tainable harm.230 Resolution of the problem to prevent self serving
actions that do not produce ascertainable harm can be accomplished
by analogizing to the law of trusts.23' Courts often have turned to
trust law for defining standards of corporate fiduciary duty. 2
Under California case law, a trustee or other fiduciary is guilty
of "constructive fraud" '233 against the beneficiary and exposed to tort
and punitive damages for acquiring an adverse or personal interest
in the cestui. 34 Punitive damages may be imposed upon a showing
of abuse of the fiduciary duty, even though the complaining party
is unable to show an ascertainable harm.3 In the corporate law con-
text, however, as exhibited by Ahmanson, courts rarely mention the
imposition of a constructive trust upon corporate fiduciaries.236 If the
special corporate fiduciary relationship is intentionally breached, courts
should impose a punishment for this violation. Plaintiffs injured by
224. See id.
225. See Frankel, supra note 5, at 808-11.
226. See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 222, at 648.
227. See Geneen, supra note 21, at 31.
228. See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 222, at 648.
229. See Ahmanson I, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 303.
230. Werschkull v. United California Bank, 85 Cal. App. 3d 981, 1002, 149 Cal. Rptr.
829, 842 (1978).
231. See id.
232. Frankel, supra note 5, at 804-08.
233. CAL. CIV. CODE §1573 provides that:
Constructive fraud consists: (1) In any breach of duty which, without an actually
fraudulent intent, gains an advantage to the person in fault, or any one claiming
under him, by misleading another to his prejudice, or to the prejudice of anyone
claiming under him; or, (2) In any such act or omission as the law specially declares
to be fraudulent, without respect to actual fraud.
234. Werschkull, 85 Cal. App. 3d at 1002, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
235. Id.
236. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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the bad faith conduct of corporate fiduciaries should have a tort
remedy.
TORT REMEDY SHOULD BE AVAILABLE
The breach of a duty that is imposed by society lays a foundation
for a tort remedy.237 A tort remedy for intentional breach of fiduciary
duty would afford greater protection to the individual right interest
of shareholders.238 This protection should not, however, undermine
the corporate might doctrine.
239
A. Greater Shareholder Protection not Destructive
to Corporations
The purpose of the proposed tort remedy is to deter willful and
wrongful breaches of the duty of good faith and inherent fairness
owed to the corporation and shareholders by corporate fiduciaries.240
California has recognized that wrongful acts committed in the course
of contractual relationships may afford both tort and contract relief.
241
The corporate fiduciary relationship is analogous to those contrac-
tual relationships. In each of these relationships, the individual right
doctrine must be balanced against a policy of promoting business in
the American economic system.24 2 In recognition of the special trust
owed by corporate fiduciaries,243 the same theory affording protec-
tion to insureds and employees should be extended to shareholders.
As made clear in these other relationships, a tort remedy in the cor-
porate context will not spell the doom of business interests.2 '4
The tort remedy should be directed, as in the insurance and employ-
ment relationships, toward bad faith and not mere negligence. 245 As
long as the corporate fiduciary acts reasonably and in good faith,
there would be no basis for personal liability.24 6 Since this standard
embodies the current state of the law, only the remedy would be
changed.24 7 Consequently, the adoption of a tort remedy would not
237. Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 174-75, 610 P.2d at 1334-35, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 843-44.
238. See supra notes 197-236 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 151-79 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 151-74 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 16-19, 32 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 197-221 and accompanying text.
246. This is the currently accepted business judgment standard. See supra notes 147-50 and
accompanying text.
247. Id.
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impinge upon honest business decisions, but would discourage cor-
porate fiduciaries from acting in conscious disregard of the duty they
have assumed.2"8 The parameters of liability of the bad faith corporate
fiduciary must be tailored to preserve corporate might interests.249
Courts may draw on other areas, including insurance, employment,
and trust law, to articulate the boundaries of this liability.25 0 This
author does not attempt to apply the identical bad faith standards
existing in the insurance and employment areas. The balance struck
between corporate might and individual right should reflect the unique
interests of corporate law. Given the vulnerability of insureds, a very
high good faith standard has been applied to the insurer. 25' The same
high standard may not be appropriate, however, if applied to cor-
porate fiduciaries.252 On the other hand, the Tameny standard is too
lenient to be applied to corporate fiduciaries since employers do not
have a fiduciary duty to account for business decisions to employees.
25
Furthermore, the risk of abuse of the corporate fiduciary relation-
ship is greater than the risk of abuse by the employer.2 4
CONCLUSION
This author has discussed some of the problems of protecting the
individual right to be free from unreasonable harm in the corporate
context in the absence of tort remedies. An analogy was drawn between
the rationale of the modern tort policy of California and the historic
duty of good faith and inherent fairness owed by corporate fiduciaries.
This examination found that existing compensatory damages are
inadequate. In addition, little, if any, deterrent effect currently exists
to prevent the corporate fiduciary from acting in bad faith. Adop-
tion of a tort remedy, however, would provide a greater deterrent
to the conscious disregard of this duty of good faith, and yet would
not impede the honest business judgment of corporate executives in
pursuit of profits.
A cohesive policy of fiduciary law should set the standards and
create the obligations with respect to internal corporate accountability.
Adoption of this proposed tort remedy would further the greater pro-
tection needed for shareholders. A tort remedy for bad faith would
248. See id.
249. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
250. Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 176, 610 P.2d at 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
251. See Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 768-69, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362,
252. See Frankel, supra note 5, at 810.
253. See id.
254. See id.
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help to restore the balance between the corporate might and individual
right. In the best interests of society, tort sanctions for socially unac-
ceptable bad faith conduct also should apply to corporate fiduciaries.
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